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Abstract The private sector is one of the sources of finance included in developed
countries’ pledge in the UN climate negotiations to mobilise $100 billion annually by 2020
to support developing countries’ efforts to address climate change. For adaptation in
particular, it remains unclear what mobilised private finance is. Research so far has focused
on its potential and experiences in developing countries, but not on the arguments of those
who introduced and continue to advocate private adaptation finance: developed countries.
This paper investigates the positions of developed countries and development banks and
agencies. In particular, it aims to identify whether those actors can reach a common
understanding of private adaptation finance that minimises norm conflicts in a fragmented
climate finance system. Empirically, the paper examines the Biennial Reports and sub-
missions on Strategies and Approaches for Mobilising Scaled-up Finance of six developed
country parties, as well as data from interviews with experts from development banks and
agencies. The analysis finds a number of discrepancies between these sets of actors, for
example on motivations for and modes of private sector involvement. This discrepancy is
the result of ambiguity around the concept of private adaptation finance in a highly
fragmented climate finance architecture. This ambiguity is problematic when the aim of
mobilising private adaptation finance is to contribute to the $100 billion commitment.
However, if the aim is adaptation in practice, both ambiguity and fragmentation might
actually make the climate finance system more inclusive and innovative.
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ADB Asian Development Bank
AfD Agence Franc¸aise de De´veloppement
BR Biennial Report
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DEG Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft
EIB European Investment Bank
GCF Green Climate Fund
GEF Global Environment Facility
GIZ German Society for International Cooperation
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JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
KfW Kreditanstalt fu¨r Wiederaufbau/KfW Development Bank
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MSF Strategies and Approaches for Mobilising Scaled-up Finance
PPCR Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USAID United States Agency for International Development
1 Introduction
Climate change already impacts natural and human systems on all continents and across
the oceans (IPCC 2014). Developing countries are historically least responsible for the
emissions that cause climate change, but most vulnerable to its impacts (Ayers 2011), with
global costs of adaptation estimated at US$280 to $500 billion by 2050 (UNEP 2016).1
Developed countries recognise the need for substantial financial resources to meet the costs
of adaptation and mitigation, and pledged to mobilise $100 billion annually by 2020 at the
UN climate negotiations in 2009 (UNFCCC 2009: Decision 2/CP.15, paragraph 8; special
issue Editorial).
This paper focuses on one of the most contested aspects of climate finance: private
adaptation finance. Research on this topic so far focuses on its potential and experiences in
developing countries (cf. Atteridge 2011; Intellecap 2010; Pauw 2014; Pauw et al. 2015),
but not on the arguments of those who introduced and continue to advocate it. This paper
aims to fill this research gap by investigating the positions of developed countries as well
as development banks and agencies. In particular, it aims to identify whether these actors
can reach a common understanding of private adaptation finance that minimises norm
conflicts in a fragmented climate finance system.
The ‘‘private sector’’ is a broad concept. This paper refers to it as all for-profit non-state
organisations and individuals in all economic sectors. In adaptation, this ranges from
smallholder farmers all the way to multinationals, for instance in construction or finance.
1 All monetary values are in US$.
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These actors can implement and/or finance adaptation. Private adaptation finance is fun-
damentally different from and more complex than private mitigation finance. The cost per
ton of abated greenhouse gas emissions is a useful proxy to measure the effectiveness of
mitigation investments. The concept of adaptation, however, remains characterised by
epistemic ambiguity (see Hall, this issue), and its impacts are hard to measure. Adaptation
is carried out amid uncertainty about actual and projected climate change, and costs
potentially remain with the investor, whereas benefits are often largely public (Abadie et al.
2012; Atteridge and Dzebo 2015; Project Catalyst 2010).
Although climate finance does not have a broadly accepted definition (Brunner and
Enting 2014; UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance 2014), first attempts have been
made to define (mobilised) private climate finance (see Jachnik et al. 2015; Brown et al.
2015; Vivid Economics 2015). The best definition of publicly mobilised private adaptation
finance is probably from Brown et al. (2015: IV): ‘‘private finance invested as a result of
adaptation-related public interventions, which can typically take the form of finance or
policies’’. However, this definition does not resolve contentious issues about the type of
actors (which could include institutional investors, insurers, banks, philanthropy, and other
instrument) or finance instruments (which could include bank loans, bonds, and insurance).
Furthermore, the definition does not explain how to prevent public interventions from
creating inappropriate subsidies or crowding out private actors.
Developing countries are sceptical about private adaptation finance: the potential is
unclear given the limited experience, and many countries fear that private finance will
replace public finance (cf. Pauw 2014; Surminski 2013). The work programme on long-
term finance of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
points out that the current mix of public and private funds mobilised may not meet the
needs for adaptation finance (UNFCCC 2013a). It also shows that private finance is
generally inclined towards mitigation, and that an emphasis on private finance could
further disadvantage adaptation (see also Whitley and Mohanty (2012, 2013) for empirical
evidence on this). Finally, the report calls for improved transparency on climate finance by
defining mobilised private finance in the context of the $100 billion commitment
(UNFCCC 2013a).
Despite the unclear definition and limited experience, developed countries push for
mobilising private climate finance. For example, in 2008 they established the Pilot Pro-
gramme for Climate Resilience (PPCR), which explicitly aims to mobilise private co-
financing for adaptation projects in developing countries. In 2009, developed countries
refused to support the Copenhagen Accord if the private sector was not included as a
source of climate finance (Romani and Stern 2011). And in 2013, after a push by developed
countries in particular, the Green Climate Fund (GCF) established a Private Sector Facility,
which targets international businesses and capital markets to catalyse clean investments
and innovation.
As outlined in the special issue Editorial, effective mobilisation of private investments
in adaptation partly depends on the governance architecture of the ‘‘climate finance sys-
tem’’ at large. The term architecture does not presume that there is one architect or
regulation from one (dominant) regime only: it is a neutral term and allows for an analysis
of policy domains with multiple regimes (Biermann et al. 2009). The climate finance
system is highly fragmented. Fragmentation is an inherent structural characteristic of
present-day international relations (Zelli and van Asselt 2013: 3). Biermann et al. (2009)
describe fragmentation as a continuum ranging from a synergistic (higher) to a conflictive
(lower) degree of fragmentation. Their typology of fragmentation of governance
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architecture highlights the importance of ‘‘institutional integration’’, ‘‘actor constella-
tions’’, and ‘‘norm conflicts’’ (see also special issue Editorial).
• Institutional integration the UNFCCC is the core of the climate finance architecture.
This is where countries decide on climate finance aims, targets, and proceedings.
However, this core would be unable to address its main objective—to prevent
dangerous climate change—and therefore dysfunctional without its wider spheres (or
categories) of institutional fragmentation, including specialised UN agencies (e.g. the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP)); other multilateral as well as bilateral institutions (including the
banks and agencies from which experts were interviewed for this paper—see Sect. 2),
climate funds, climate trust funds, etc.
• Actor constellations the above-mentioned spheres and actors are only loosely
integrated. Beyond the bifurcation between developed countries (providing finance)
and developing countries (receiving finance), many actors focus on certain regions (e.g.
the Asian Development Bank) or groups of countries (e.g. the Least Developed
Countries Fund). Other actors have particular roles, such as funding projects (where the
GCF and the many other climate funds also fund particular types of projects) or
tracking climate finance (e.g. the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and Climate Policy Initiative).
• Norm conflicts between the above-mentioned institutions in the climate finance system
are abundant. This paper focuses on the norm conflict on private adaptation finance.
The two sets of actors in the climate finance system studied in this paper (developed
countries and development banks and agencies) are crucial in the climate finance system’s
architecture. Their control over financial resources allows them to dominate much of the
policy process and to lead the debate. Developed countries provide public climate finance
and insisted on private finance as a source of the $100 billion commitment. Development
banks and agencies, including those represented by the respondents (see Sect. 2), were
originally established to serve development purposes and have expanded their tasks to also
mobilise, manage, and provide climate finance in the last decade in particular. In that
sense, they are ‘‘inherited’’ from the development regime (see also Delina, this issue). They
are predominantly owned by developed countries and affiliated with their perspectives on
private adaptation finance. As empirical data, this paper first analyses political statements
of six developed countries based on recent 24 submissions to the UNFCCC. Second, the
distilled information is triangulated and deepened through expert interviews with devel-
opment banks and agencies. It is beyond the scope of this paper to describe individual
projects and their effectiveness. Instead, this paper focuses on institutional perspectives on
private adaptation finance in order to accommodate the views of the targeted sets of actors
in the climate finance system.
The next section describes the research method in detail. Section 3 provides the results
of the document analysis and the interviews in four subsections: (1) defining the mobili-
sation of private adaptation finance and motivations to do so; (2) early experiences; (3)
actors, instruments, and modalities used; and (4) tracking of private finance in the context
of the $100 billion commitment. Section 4 concludes.
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2 Method
This paper first analyses four sets of documents from Canada, the EU, Japan, New Zealand,
Norway, and the USA on their perspective on private adaptation finance: their Biennial
Reports (BR) of 2014 (BR1) and 2015/2016 (BR2);2 and their submissions on Strategies
and Approaches for Mobilising Scaled-up Finance of 2013 (MSF) and 2014 (MSF2).3
Biennial Reports are formulated by developed countries only. They should include
complete, transparent, accurate, comparable, and consistent information on a variety of
issues including emission reductions and the provision of financial, technology, and
capacity-building support to developing countries, and, ‘‘to the extent possible’’, on
bilaterally leveraged private climate finance.4 Furthermore, developed countries should
report on policies and measures that promote the up-scaling of private investment in
mitigation and adaptation activities in developing countries (UNFCCC 2011: Decision
2/CP.17, paragraphs 12–22). This may lead to an incomplete picture, since BRs do not
cover private finance mobilised by multilateral funds including the PPCR, the Global
Environment Facility, and in the future the GCF (Iro 2014).
Therefore, this paper also analyses MSF submissions. In the context of the challenge to
mobilise $100 billion per year by 2020, developed countries were invited in 2012 to
provide information on their strategies and approaches towards this goal (UNFCCC 2013c:
Decision 1/CP.18, paragraph 67). Given the lack of guidelines, submissions vary signifi-
cantly in structure and length (between 3 and 81 pages).
Only Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, and the USA (as countries) and the EU (as
a group of countries) submitted all four documents. Together, they represent 21 out of all
24 ‘‘Annex II Parties’’: countries that committed to providing climate finance to developing
countries in the 1992 UNFCCC. They represent 95% of the Gross Domestic Product, 96%
of the emissions, and 97% of the population of all Annex II Parties (World Bank 2015).5
Second, findings were triangulated and deepened through semi-structured interviews
with climate finance and adaptation experts from bilateral and multilateral development
banks and development agencies between November 2014 and March 2015. Here, the
focus was on organisations that are predominantly or fully owned by developed countries
and inherited from the development regime (i.e. not climate funds such as the GCF or the
Adaptation Fund). These organisations are more likely to argue from a developed country
perspective given their donor-driven decision-making processes (see Gupta 1995; Kilby
2006; Neumayer 2003). The interviews were essential for two reasons. First, the analysed
documents are likely to be partly politically motivated. Although this helps to understand
the framing of developed countries, it might be at the cost of content. Second, policies do
not only live in the formal texts that define them, but also in the ways in which they are
applied on a daily basis in the form of rules, local practises, procedures, and guidelines
(Best 2012a). The interviews addressed both issues and added important practical and
2 References to those documents in this paper will be according to these abbreviations: BR1: First biennial
reports (UNFCCC 2014a); BR2: Second biennial reports (UNFCCC 2016).
3 References to those documents in this paper will be according to these abbreviations: MSF1: Submissions
from Parties to the COP (UNFCCC 2013b); MFS2: Submission Portal (UNFCCC 2014b).
4 ‘‘Leveraging’’ and ‘‘mobilising’’ are often used interchangeably (see, e.g. Brown et al. 2011; Stadelmann
et al. 2011). Following Caruso and Ellis (2013), this paper uses the term ‘‘mobilise’’ in the political context
of the $100 billion climate finance commitment, and ‘‘leverage’’, only in reference to financial instruments.
It mostly refers to private finance (see Table 2).
5 The EU is an Annex II Party, but not all its Member States are. These percentages do not include those EU
countries that are not Annex II Parties, such as Poland and Slovakia.
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experience-driven layers to the perspectives. Thirteen experts were interviewed from the
Asian Development Bank (ADB), Agence Franc¸aise de De´veloppement (AfD), Deutsche
Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft (DEG), European Investment Bank (EIB),
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB, two interviews), Global Environment Facility
(GEF), Deutsche Gesellschaft fu¨r Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ, two interviews),
International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank Group, Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA), Kreditanstalt fu¨r Wiederaufbau (KfW), and USAID. This
limited number of semi-structured interviews allowed for an in-depth, ‘‘within-case’’
analysis to better understand causalities (cf. Gschwend 2007). Only experts from donor
organisations were interviewed because this paper investigates the positions of developed
countries and development banks and agencies.
Draft interview questions were first discussed with three researchers working on
adaptation and global environmental governance and were pretested with a climate finance
expert from a development bank (not included as an interviewee). The interviewees were
carefully selected. Just like the author, most of them observe and participate in climate
finance workshops and conferences within and outside of the UNFCCC regime. Some
interviewees were recommended by their peers or superiors. All interviewees are either
active in adaptation projects, or have in-depth knowledge about their organisations’ pro-
jects because their position requires this. The sample of interviewees is representative: it
covers a large share of a limited target group that is active in many different regions in the
world. The interviewees were guaranteed anonymity in order for them to speak more
freely.
3 Political and practical perspectives
This section describes motivations to mobilise private adaptation finance; recent practices;
actors, instruments and modalities; and tracking of mobilised private adaptation finance in
four subsections. Each subsection provides the perspectives of developed countries (based
on the BRs and MSFs); critical reflections by respondents from development banks and
agencies; as well as implications of the results for the climate finance system based on the
fragmentation typology by Biermann et al. (2009).
3.1 Motivation for private adaptation finance
All analysed countries want to mobilise private finance in order to reach the $100 billion
commitment. The EU (MSF1: 63) describes private finance mobilisation as ‘‘a key part’’
and Japan (MSF1: 1) as ‘‘essential’’. Japan (BR2) states to have mobilised $3.6 billion of
private finance in 2013–2014, but this was predominantly mitigation finance.
Most countries provide additional motivations for mobilising private finance (see
Table 1). The EU, New Zealand, and Norway consider private finance key to limit global
warming to 2 C. The EU, New Zealand, Norway, and the USA mention the importance of
the private sector for countries’ transition to low-carbon and resilient economies. Some
countries make it clear that public funding alone is insufficient for the challenge of climate
change. The US (BR1; BR2) calls its public resources ‘‘significant, but finite’’ and Norway
(BR2) points out that the dominant global financial flows are private. Japan furthermore
states that private finance is ‘‘crucially important’’ for large investments, such as infras-
tructure projects (BR1: BR2).
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Despite arguing for the importance of mobilised private finance, countries do not define
mobilised private adaptation finance in their submissions. The interviews confirm this.
Only two respondents state that developed countries sufficiently define private adaptation
finance. One respondent states that the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) offers tangible criteria to measure public climate finance, which should be elabo-
rated to include private finance in the future. The other respondent states that a vague
definition can be interpreted in multiple ways, thus allowing his organisation to be
opportunistic. Ambiguous policies that leave room for interpretation can indeed help
international organisations to be more functional and have more power (Best 2012b). Such
ambiguity, however, also contributes to a proliferation of activities labelled as adaptation
and to difficulties in tracking and monitoring adaptation assistance (Hall, this issue). Most
respondents state that adaptation is a vague concept; five respondents emphasise that the
UNFCCC has not defined private adaptation financing. Four respondents state that at least
there should be a differentiation between private investors that provide adaptation finance
and businesses that implement adaptation, and between sector types and private actors (e.g.
small enterprises and infrastructure).
The respondents are sceptical about developed countries’ motivations for mobilising
private finance for adaptation. Several respondents interpret the emphasis on private
finance as a strong signal to involve the private sector in projects. However, all respondents
find the provided motivation of reaching the $100 billion commitment counterproductive.
This is considered a global negotiation issue to which, according to some respondents, both
the private sector and project managers at development banks are indifferent in their day-
to-day activities. Several respondents furthermore state that the ‘‘2 C target’’ relates to
mitigation only. The ‘‘transition’’, which is more dominant in later reporting, was appre-
ciated. Two respondents point to the important role private finance could play here.
The development banks and agencies instead cooperate with the private sector to fulfil
their pre-existing development mission, including sustained creation of jobs, financial
sector development, and economic growth. Resilience is crucial for development. As one
respondent from a multilateral development bank states: ‘‘a country cannot be resilient if
the private sector is not resilient’’’ (Interview, 25 March 2015). Issues such as stability and
the prevention of climate refugees, among others, are side benefits. Also, three respondents
state that it is impossible not to cooperate with the private sector in one way or another in
adaptation projects. These statements refer to businesses that implement adaptation (either
Table 1 Developed country motivations to include the private sector as a source of climate finance as









Canada 2 0 0 0
EU 3 3 1 0
Japan 2 0 0 2
New Zealand 1 1 2 0
Norway 1 2 1 0
USA 1 2 0 0
The numbers in the table indicate the number of submissions by a country providing this motivation
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autonomous or financed through public climate finance) rather than to private investors that
provide adaptation finance.
In summary although there is no synergy between developed countries and the inter-
viewed development banks and agencies on the definition of private adaptation finance and
the motivation to mobilise it, there is no conflict either. This can be attributed to the
ambiguous delegation from developed countries: it provides development banks and
agencies with flexibility in their adaptation projects with the private sector (cf. Hall, this
issue).
3.2 Recent practice
The developed country documents analysed in this paper focus on recent practices with
mobilising private mitigation finance and say little about mobilised private adaption
finance. Japan mobilised some private adaptation finance through trade insurance and co-
financing by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) (BR1). Japan also states
that adaptation projects tend to generate relatively little financial return to the private sector
compared to mitigation projects, and that many adaptation projects do not deliver a
financial return at all (MSF1). Canada (BR1: 244) states that ‘‘there are a number of
potential barriers to facilitating sufficient private investment’’. Yet it hardly describes such
barriers or how to overcome them. Canada contributes much of its climate finance to
multilateral organisations (including the IFC, IDB and ADB), thus outsourcing its
mobilisation of private climate finance (see BR2).
New Zealand (MSF1) and Norway (BR1) do report on adaptation projects undertaken in
cooperation with the private sector. Yet instead of financing, the private sector was
implementing projects. This mirrors the differentiation that many respondents refer to, as
explained in the previous subsection. Pauw (2014) also illustrates this: in the agricultural
sector in Zambia, the (domestic) private sector can implement adaptation, but few
opportunities exist for (international) private financing of adaptation.
Finally, although all countries emphasise the importance of strategy development and
capacity building for adaptation, they do not involve the private sector here. For example,
the EU does not mention the private sector when it explains its strengthened support for
building human and technical capacity (BR1). The US (BR1; BR2) aims to engage the
private sector through capacity building and strategy development in developing countries,
but examples of its assistance focus on partner governments and civil society, even though
the for-profit private sector has much more investment potential than the non-profit private
sector. Finally, Japan (BR1: 83) claims to have developed its fast-start finance projects in
‘‘close consultation’’ but examples of this only refer to developing country governments
and international organisations.
Although respondents confirm that there is very little experience with leveraging private
adaptation finance, two-thirds report examples of public–private cooperation on adaptation,
either with private investors or with businesses that implement adaptation (actors,
instruments, and modalities will be discussed in the next subsection). Examples come from
the following sectors: agriculture (five times); water management; water-intensive indus-
tries; infrastructure (all twice); insurance; financial sector; and tourism (all once). Such
cooperation leads to private implementation of adaptation, and inherently to private
expenditure too. Yet the respondents could usually not tell how much the private coun-
terpart spent on adaptation. Indeed, accounting of such expenditure as private adaptation
finance is difficult (Atteridge and Dzebo 2015; Brown et al. 2015).
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Only one development bank official mentions an example where private finance was
leveraged—with a ratio of 1:2. The bank covered the full incremental costs of adaptation
and the private investor only covered the business-as-usual investment. Discussions on the
share of such investments that could count as adaptation finance have hardly started (see
Sect. 3.4; Hall, this issue). Respondents generally see possibilities to mobilise private
investments when co-benefits can be created, such as reduced water or energy use. In this
context, they mention water management (twice); tourism (once); and agriculture (once).
Furthermore, respondents mention service sectors (e.g. insurance, information services,
risk assessments (all once)) and large-scale infrastructure projects with revenue streams,
such as through toll roads (once).
Most respondents state that it is crucial for private sector involvement in both financing
and implementing adaptation to build capacity (six times); raise awareness and provide
information (three times); provide guidance in initial phases of projects (twice); and
demonstrate successful adaptation to promote up-scaling and replication (once). Some
respondents state that although the private sector might have experience with weather-
related disasters such as heat waves and floods, it still needs to develop greater awareness
and understanding about climate change. One respondent states that public–private part-
nerships can be a good vehicle here. For example, the IFC financed a $200,000 study on
adaptation options for a port in Colombia. Its outcomes led to a private $20 million
investment, financed through a commercial loan (Druce et al. 2016). Furthermore, three
respondents emphasise that capacity building also helps the public sector to better
understand the private sector perspective on adaptation.
This section showed that most cooperation with the private sector on adaptation so far
relates to implementation (and inherently to private expenditure on adaptation), rather than
to private adaptation financing. Although this might conflict with the first aim in Table 1
(reaching the $100 billion commitment), it does not conflict with the second aim (mo-
bilising private investments for a transition towards climate-resilient economies). Fur-
thermore, the conflict on the mobilisation of $100 billion of climate finance and the
perceived importance of capacity building indicate a cooperative but incomplete actor
constellation. Many private actors have a limited understanding of adaptation, and an even
lower awareness on (discussions about) private adaptation finance at the UN climate
change negotiations (cf. Pauw et al. 2015).
3.3 Actors, instruments, and modalities
Most analysed countries acknowledge that they have to move forward together and with
the private sector in order to reach the $100 billion commitment. The countries also
emphasise the importance of enabling environments. However, neither the ‘‘partnership’’
nor the enabling environments are elaborated in detail.
Canada, Japan, and the USA point to the importance of multilateral channels to leverage
private finance. In their MSF2, the EU, Japan, and the USA signal the importance of the
newly established Private Sector Facility of the GCF. The EU (MSF1) focuses on support
for small and medium enterprises in developing countries. Most emphasis, however, is put
on both domestic and developing country governments that need to create an enabling
environment for the mobilisation of private adaptation finance. Stenek et al. (2013)
structure enabling environments along five categories: provision of (weather and climate)
data and information; institutional arrangements (e.g. partnerships); conducive policies
(e.g. technical standards and zoning regulations); economic incentives (e.g. taxes and
subsidies); and communication and technology (e.g. encouraging knowledge and
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technology transfer). These are generally to be addressed domestically, but they can also be
organised or supported internationally (Pauw 2014).
Domestically, for example, the EU (MSF1: BR1) plans to mainstream climate policy
into public and private investments to reduce risks of investments, build capacity, and
develop a project pipeline. In an international context, Canada (BR1) considers capacity
building and the development of financeable projects an effective use of climate finance.
New Zealand (MSF1) proposes to increase private adaptation finance by encouraging and
supporting developing countries to develop strategies in order to provide the private sector
the confidence and policy certainty to make investments. The EU (MSF1: 2) also states that
‘‘countries with a sound climate policy framework are well positioned to attract interna-
tional and domestic climate finance’’ and support developing countries to build capacity to
attract climate finance.
The USA, Japan, and Norway take a harder stance. The USA emphasises developing
countries’ own responsibility when stating that ‘‘strategies for mobilizing finance in and to
developing countries will be incomplete without developing countries doing their part to
strengthen domestic enabling environments’’ (MSF1: 3). Japan (MSF1) explicitly mentions
the limited enabling environment in developing countries (including a lack of hard and soft
infrastructure) as the main barrier to scale up private finance in climate change mitigation
and adaptation. Norway goes one step further. According to Norway, effective climate
action by developing countries and these countries’ steps to improve enabling environ-
ments (which should be ‘‘fuelled by national self-interest’’) are even a requirement for the
$100 billion commitment to be met (MSF1: 7). This statement puts the responsibility to
mobilise finance partly in the hands of the recipients.
All respondents acknowledge the importance of a favourable enabling environment for
adaptation. On a very practical level, two respondents for example state that it would be
useful to list and describe all potential adaptive measures—in particular those that lower
the costs of production—and to showcase replicable and easy-to-understand projects.
However, respondents put more emphasises on the importance of the broader context
when implementing adaptation projects with the private sector for three reasons. First,
three respondents point out that much of the enabling environment for private climate
finance actually depends on the general business environment. This goes beyond the five
categories of Stenek et al. (2013) and includes for instance low levels of bureaucracy or
good transport and IT infrastructure.
Second, respondents emphasise that enabling environment should encompass more than
adaptation alone, because both public and private actors are often unfamiliar with the
concept of adaptation. Two respondents note that the specifics of private adaptation are
unclear even to countries that make an effort to create an enabling environment for private
climate finance. Two other respondents state that it is irrelevant for the private sector
whether investments that contribute to adaptation (based on expert judgement) are actually
labelled as such. In general, most respondents themselves also refer to increasing resilience
and reducing vulnerability, rather than to adaptation.
Finally, respondents point to the difference between global climate negotiations and the
level of project implementation. For example, the analysis above shows that enabling
environments for private investments are imperative for developed countries in the
UNFCCC negotiations. Here, there is a norm conflict with many developing countries: four
respondents state that many developing countries oppose the general notion of private
adaptation finance at the UNFCCC negotiations (the author also observed this repeatedly).
However, on the level of implementation, such political standpoints on private adaptation
finance are less relevant. Half of the interviewees are under the impression that developing
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countries even prefer private investments over public finance, given that the private sector
can create longer-term jobs, economic development, and tax revenues.
Instruments to leverage private finance that countries mention are skewed towards
mitigation. The analysed submissions scarcely mention instruments to leverage private
adaptation finance and generally not describe details (see Table 2). Canada (MSF1: 3) for
instance writes that ‘‘insurance and other market-based approaches can help address those
adaptation risks that are financeable’’. Japan (MSF1) mentions concessional loans and
insurance mechanisms. More concretely, Japan is working on standby loans for disaster
recovery and weather-related insurance provided by private companies. The EU (MSF1)
states that it has finance instruments that target specific market failures and that are
designed not to crowd out or over-subsidise the private sector. It describes the use of grants
to leverage public finance (including official development assistance) and private sector
financing though regional blending mechanisms. Instruments for this purpose include
grants, technical assistance, interest-rate subsidies, risk capital, and guarantees. Although
the blending facilities have mainly supported public investments so far, the EU intends to
increase the use for facilitating private sector participation.
Canada (MSF1), New Zealand (MSF2), and the USA (BR1; BR2) state that public grant
support should be considered where affordable market-based financing is not available, for
example for adaptation in the poorest and most vulnerable countries. Yet the US (BR1;
BR2) also turns the argument around by stating that such means can be made available if
private finance can be leveraged more efficiently elsewhere. Canada (MSF1) furthermore
states that non-grant financing, including (concessional) loans, should be the primary
choice in middle-income countries or where the private sector is involved. Japan (MSF1: 3)
on the other hand separates public and private responsibilities (and consequently financing)
when it states that ‘‘private companies basically seek to invest in projects which deliver a
financial return without receiving public assistance’’, but that the private sector does expect
public support through enabling environments in developing countries.
Finally, all countries use non-financing instruments such as technology transfer and
capacity building. However, only the US (BR1) and Norway (BR1) mention this instru-
ment in the context of leveraging private finance with examples on mitigation only.
Respondents provided different views on financial instruments. First, they did not
mention examples of export credit and guarantees. A potential explanation is that these
instruments are not within their mandates.
Table 2 Financial instruments to leverage private adaptation finance, as described in BRs and MSFs
Canada EU Japan Norway USA
Non-financial instruments 2 2 1 2
Grants 2 2 1 2
Guarantees 2 1 2
Concessional loans 2 2
Insurance 2 2
Loans 2 2
Export credit 1 1
Lines of credit 1
A ‘‘2’’ indicates a country elaborates on an instrument at least once. A ‘‘1’’ means a country mentioned an
instrument without elaborating on it. New Zealand did not describe specific instruments
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Second, respondents put more emphasis on loans (mentioned six times) and lines of
credit (three times). Through the latter, development banks finance local private banks and
other intermediaries in developing countries, which on-lend the credit to private end-
borrowers that would otherwise struggle to get finance. Two respondents from develop-
ment banks however state that it is not in their mandate to finance the private sector
directly.
Finally, in contrast to the analysed developed countries, most respondents emphasise
that technical assistance is crucial in projects, and one respondent mentions green bonds.
Technical assistance, both for financial institutions and for those who implement adapta-
tion projects, can be financed through grants. Bonds are mentioned in the context of cities
with comprehensive adaptation strategies. If related adaptation measures have a return on
investment, or if a city plans to finance them publicly anyway, bonds could frontload
investments.
To summarise the implications for the fragmented climate finance system: developed
countries and the development banks and agencies share the norm that enabling envi-
ronments are important to mobilise private adaptation finance and private adaptation
implementation. However, there are different views on the importance of enabling envi-
ronments for adaptation, even between countries. Just like the minor differences in the
instruments that countries and development banks and agencies refer to, this does not cause
conflicts for the institutional integration, norms, or actor constellations. A more important
contrast, however, seems to be that at a local level, development banks, and agencies
perceive that they have synergies with developing countries when it comes to adaptation
projects with the private sector. In global climate change negotiations, however, there is a
norm conflict between developed countries (advocating for private finance) and developing
countries (disapproving of it).
3.4 Tracking private adaptation finance
Measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) of climate finance helps to gain a better
overall understanding of its scale, distribution, and use. It is technically complex and
touches upon highly political and sensitive definitional questions (Iro 2014). Currently,
there is limited publicly available data on private adaptation finance mobilised by public
interventions in and to developing countries (UNEP 2016), and there is no agreed defi-
nition on how to account for private adaptation finance (Brown et al. 2015; Buchner et al.
2015; Vivid Economics 2015).
The EU (MSF1) emphasises the need to advance towards an agreed definition as well as
accounting and monitoring of private climate flows. It mentions the complexities sur-
rounding data availability, the multitude of actors involved, diverse channels of finance,
and rapidly fluctuating activities. According to the EU (MSF1), a common understanding
of private climate finance is necessary to ensure transparency and trust. The EU expresses
support to ongoing research on this matter, and, just like Japan (MSF1) and Canada
(MSF1), states that this process should be gone through in close cooperation with other
donors.
Canada (MSF1), Norway (MSF1), and New Zealand state that there should be a focus
on outcomes; according to New Zealand (MSF1), this would ensure that the results of
climate finance interventions can be tracked and reported. Norway (MSF1) states that a
focus on outcomes also makes developing country partners accountable for reaching
desired climate results.
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New Zealand and the USA also criticise tracking. For example, New Zealand (MSF1)
states that burdensome reporting and application procedures can deter uptake and further
mobilisation of climate finance. The USA points to the range of actors involved and the
vast variety of financing tools and policies needed to enable mitigation and adaptation
activities. According to the USA (BR1: 1), this should be recognised, ‘‘rather than seeking
overly simplified solutions focused on a particular delivery channel, sector, or financing
approach’’. At the same time, however, the USA only describes three financial instruments
in their submissions (see Table 2).
All respondents’ organisations report their climate finance contributions using the
OECD-DAC Rio Markers. Although these markers were originally introduced by the
OECD-DAC to indicate donor’s environmental policy objectives in development coop-
eration (Iro 2014), they are also used to measure climate finance. Some respondents state
that their organisations also monitor and report because of internal targets on financing (for
instance renewable energy or climate, twice); because they want to demonstrate that the
organisation is an important player in climate finance (twice); or because of accountability
towards taxpayers (once).
However, only four respondents mention that their organisation reports on mobilised
private adaptation finance, emphasising how difficult this is. The respondents provide three
reasons for this: first, internal lack of preparedness. One organisation undertook a reporting
exercise before the UN Climate Summit in New York in 2014. According to the respon-
dent, this exercise clarified that there is currently no information available on mobilised
private adaptation finance. Future monitoring and reporting would require a new system to
be built up; second, limited willingness from the private sector to undertake MRV. Apart
from an administrative burden, two respondents also mention confidentiality and com-
petitiveness as potential issues for the private sector. Third, three respondents mention that
without a clear definition of adaptation finance, MRV will be difficult and perhaps not very
useful. For example, two respondents state that their institution covers the incremental
costs of adaptation. Similarly, one development bank covered the costs to climate-proof a
road. Strictly speaking, the private sector’s share (the road itself) is not invested in
adaptation. In another example, three respondents highlight that the MDBs currently use
different methods in their common reporting system. This system (see EIB 2014) takes
vulnerability reduction as a starting point rather than adaptation, which could result in an
overestimate of mobilised adaptation finance. Reporting based on different methods cannot
provide final answers in terms of contributions to the $100 billion commitment.
In terms of the climate finance system, the most conflictive consequences of frag-
mentation identified in this paper relate to the accounting of mobilised private finance
towards the $100 billion commitment. Such accounting would require a cooperative (if not
synergistic) actor constellation. However, respondents see limited willingness from the
private sector to be part of MRV in the climate finance system. Furthermore, respondents
use different reporting systems themselves. Finally, developed countries disagree on the
importance and aim of tracking mobilised private finance.
4 Discussion and conclusion
This paper analyses the position of developed countries as well as development banks and
agencies towards private adaptation finance. It shows that there is a discrepancy between
the former’s position in submissions to the UN climate negotiations, and the latter’s
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understanding and local implementation of private adaptation and adaptation finance (see
Table 3). This paper shows that this discrepancy is a consequence of the fragmented
climate finance system.
In submissions to the UNFCCC, developed countries focus on the private sector in
general. They aim to mobilise private finance to reach the $100 billion commitment, and
for a transition to low-carbon and climate-resilient economies. At the level of imple-
mentation, these objectives prove to be too abstract. Here, respondents’ organisations
instead cooperate with the private sector to implement adaptation actions, in order to
increase resilience or reduce vulnerability.
Furthermore, at the level of implementation, development banks and agencies perceive
that they have scope for cooperation with developing countries: they have the impression
that developing countries also want to include the private sector in adaptation projects, as it
creates jobs, economic growth, and tax revenue. In the global climate change negotiations,
however, norm conflict remains between developed countries (advocating for private
finance) and developing countries (often disapproving of it).
Second, in line with Pauw et al. (2015), this paper concludes that the diplomatic
UNFCCC language around private adaptation finance differs from the private sector
reality. Respondents highlighted the private sector’s low awareness of political aspects and
conceptualisations of adaptation, but stated that the private sector does have practical
experience in addressing climate-related hazards such as heat waves and flooding.
Therefore, respondents do see potential for private investments in resilience in a variety of
sectors, including in developing countries. According to the respondents, technical assis-
tance could increase the private sector’s understanding of climate change and stimulate
private investment in adaptation. This need for technical assistance, in combination with
the limited mobilisation of private adaptation finance so far, shows that the private sector is
not integrated in the climate finance system. One limitation of this study is that private
sector actors were not interviewed themselves. This was not necessary for the aim of this
Table 3 Discrepancy between developed countries’ submissions to the UN climate negotiations and the




communication to UN climate
negotiations
Implementation according to respondents
from development banks and agencies
Main motivations for
private engagement




Sustained creation of jobs




‘‘Private sector’’ in general
No differentiation between
private sector financing and
implementation
Predominantly private implementation of
adaptation (rather than finance)
Need to specify sectors





(Not included in submissions) Private sector engagement wanted, sometimes
preferred over public finance as it can create
jobs, tax revenue, and economic growth
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paper, but it would be necessary for a more comprehensive analysis of the private sector’s
limited integration in the climate finance system.
The above-mentioned discrepancy illustrates how fragmented the climate finance sys-
tem is. It also demonstrates the ambiguity around concepts such as ‘‘private adaptation
finance’’, ‘‘enabling environment’’. and ‘‘mobilising’’ (see also Hall, this issue). As long as
such concepts remain ambiguous, actors’ key norms can differ without conflict. This could
facilitate the inclusion of a broad set of actors and policy approaches. It may also enhance
innovation at the level of a public agency and increase innovation in the entire system
(Biermann et al. 2009).
However, if the aim of mobilising private finance is to reach the $100 billion com-
mitment, the climate finance system requires a more static and integrated architecture. It
would need clear definitions on concepts (including mobilised private adaptation finance);
accounting rules (what counts?) as well as attribution rules (who mobilised?). This will
cause norm conflicts between important actors, given the technical difficulties in quanti-
fying the mobilisation effect of public interventions (see Brown et al. 2015; Jachnik et al.
2015) and political struggles in agreeing on how to account for private finance as part of
the $100 billion commitment in the UNFCCC regime. Furthermore, it would require a
cooperative (if not synergistic) actor constellation, but respondents perceive a low will-
ingness from the private sector to be part of the climate finance system.
Alternatively, the aim could be output: maximising the mobilisation of effective private
investments (rather than finance) in resilience and reducing vulnerability, regardless of
whether these constitute climate finance or not. In addition to the historical focus on
support for private investment at the project level (e.g. through grants, concessional
lending, and equity investments that can be accounted for), such ‘‘aiming for output’’ could
also address the increased awareness of the need for interventions at market level (cf.
Whitley 2014). An analysis of the idea that the private sector can make a substantial
contribution to adaptation finance can still be done at a later stage once more practical
experience exists.
Adaptation finance is not an end in itself, but only a means towards adaptation. Rather
than being fixated on reaching the $100 billion commitment, the climate finance system
should aim for adaptation output. This might also enhance innovation and include more
actors in the system.
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